The timing and funding of CHAPS sterling payments by Christopher Becher et al.
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 113
The Timing and Funding 
of CHAPS Sterling Payments
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he use of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems for 
the settlement of large-value payments offers considerable 
advantages, the principal one being the elimination of the credit 
risk that can arise between participants in deferred net settle-
ment systems. However, in comparison with deferred net 
settlement systems, RTGS systems require relatively large 
amounts of liquidity to support payment activity. This liquidity 
can be sourced from the settlement agent (usually a central 
bank in the case of large-value payments systems)—in the form 
of intraday overdrafts—or from incoming payments from 
other participants. 
Obtaining intraday liquidity from a central bank is typically 
costly. In order to minimise this cost and to take advantage 
of incoming payments as a funding source, participants may 
choose to delay outgoing payments. However, payment delay 
may itself prove costly. Participants face a trade-off, therefore, 
between the cost of borrowing from the central bank and the 
expected cost of delaying payments. McAndrews and Rajan 
(2000) explore this trade-off in a study of payment behaviour 
in Fedwire. They describe how the use of incoming funds 
to offset outgoing payments allows participants to avoid 
incurring costly overdrafts from the central bank and hence 
reduces the liquidity cost of making payments. Such offsetting 
can be achieved to a greater extent during activity peaks, so 
banks are induced to coordinate their payments around, 
and thereby to reinforce, these peaks.
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• Participants in CHAPS Sterling often use 
incoming funds to make payments, a process 
known as liquidity recycling.
￿ Liquidity recycling can be problematic if 
participants delay their outgoing payments in 
anticipation of incoming funds.
￿ An analysis of CHAPS payment activity shows 
that the level of liquidity recycling, though high, 
is stable throughout the day—a condition 
attributable to three features of the system.
￿ First, the settlement of time-critical payments 
in CHAPS supplies liquidity early in the day—
liquidity that can be recycled to fund less 
urgent payments. 
￿ Second, CHAPS throughput guidelines 
provide a centralised coordination mechanism 
that essentially limits any tendency toward 
payment delay. 
￿ Third, the relatively small direct membership 
of CHAPS facilitates coordination, enabling 
members to maintain a constant flux of 
payments during the day. 
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This article investigates the factors influencing the timing 
and funding of payments in the CHAPS Sterling system, 
drawing where appropriate on comparisons with payment 
activity in Fedwire. In the next section, we discuss theoretical 
approaches to the study of payment behaviour and their 
application to CHAPS Sterling. The empirical analysis of the 
timing and funding of CHAPS Sterling payments follows in 
Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical Studies 
of Payment Behaviour
Several theoretical studies have addressed the incentives facing 
participants in RTGS systems. Many focus on the afore-
mentioned trade-off between the cost of liquidity and the 
expected cost of delaying payments.
2.1 Definition of Terms
The measurement of the cost of liquidity varies according to 
the regime employed by the settlement agent (in the cases 
described in this article, that agent is the central bank). When 
credit is supplied unsecured, the cost typically takes the form of 
an explicit overdraft fee. Credit may also be provided against 
eligible collateral, in which case the cost to the participant is the 
opportunity cost of posting eligible securities with the central 
bank and hence forgoing alternative uses for those assets.
The cost of delay may take several forms. Financial penalties 
may be incurred for failure to make time-critical payments 
by specified deadlines, such as for settlement payments in 
ancillary systems or repayments of interbank loans. In 
addition, failure to make customer payments on time, or 
indeed at all, on the intended settlement date may result in 
reputational costs and a loss of future business. Also, as we 
discuss later, the reputation of a participant within a payments 
system may suffer if it is perceived to be delaying payments 
in order to “free-ride” on liquidity provided by others.
2.2 Theoretical Approaches
Bech and Garratt (2003) model the trade-off using a game-
theoretical approach, analysing the behaviour of two banks, 
both of which receive random payment requests from 
customers at the beginning of a morning and an afternoon 
period. Both banks face a fixed cost of delaying payments 
and of posting collateral for a morning or afternoon period. 
The analysis is repeated under priced and collateralised 
intraday liquidity regimes, as employed in Fedwire and 
CHAPS, respectively.1 
Under a collateralised regime, Bech and Garratt find that 
both early and delayed payments are possible equilibria, 
depending on the relative costs of liquidity and delay. The 
efficient equilibrium is for both banks to pay early. However, 
for certain levels of delay and liquidity costs, the participants 
are found to be in a prisoner’s dilemma, in which the dominant 
strategy for both is to delay payments until the afternoon, even 
though both would benefit if payments were made in the 
morning. This incentive to delay arises because it is possible to 
avoid the cost of posting collateral in the morning and instead 
to incur the (cheaper) delay cost. In these cases, there would be 
a welfare improvement if the participants could be induced 
to coordinate and to pay earlier.
Under a regime of priced credit, Bech and Garratt again find 
that multiple equilibria are possible. However, in this case, 
participants stand to benefit from synchronising payments 
with each other, since no cost is incurred by either participant 
if payments are “offset” within the time period over which 
overdraft fees are calculated. The equilibrium outcome will 
thus depend not only on the relative costs of liquidity and delay 
but also on the likelihood that the other bank will receive a 
payment request. In the specific case where the expected cost of 
delay is lower than the credit fee, and payment flows are skewed 
toward the afternoon, Bech and Garratt find that the efficient 
equilibrium involves delay until the afternoon.
In a similar study, Kobayakawa (1997) models the choice of 
whether to delay payments in RTGS systems under varying 
intraday credit arrangements. Again, the relative costs of 
liquidity and delay drive equilibrium selection. Under a system 
of priced credit, Kobayakawa (like Bech and Garratt) finds that 
delayed settlement is an equilibrium, since each participant 
seeks to avoid incurring an overdraft by delaying payments and 
thereby “free-riding” on the liquidity provided by the other 
participant. Under a collateralised regime, Kobayakawa finds 
a unique equilibrium in which both participants pay early. 
1 Bech and Garratt also examine the case of free intraday credit; however, those 
results are not discussed here.
This article investigates the factors 
influencing the timing and funding of 
payments in the CHAPS Sterling system, 
drawing where appropriate on comparisons 
with payment activity in Fedwire.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 115
However, in this case, the result is obtained by assuming that 
the opportunity cost of collateral is a sunk cost, and so liquidity 
is in effect free when the game is played. This is unsatisfactory, 
since it takes no account of the participants’ incentives to 
reduce the cost of liquidity by economising on the value of 
collateral posted. Consequently, we focus in the following 
discussion on the Bech and Garratt model.
Mills and Nesmith (2008) adapt the Bech and Garratt model 
to look at the effect of settlement risk on timing decisions in 
payments and securities settlement systems, concentrating on 
the differential impact of overdraft costs on the two types of 
systems. A main contribution of this paper is to describe a 
rationale for delays overlooked in the literature: namely, that 
banks may withhold payments until they receive information 
on the others’ ability to send funds, in order to obtain a better 
forecast of the costs of funding their own payments. More 
precisely, in the model, banks choose between paying “early” 
and paying “late.” There are no delay costs, so, in the absence 
of settlement risk, “early” is a weakly dominated strategy,2 
which may still appear in equilibrium (although only in 
risk-dominated ones). Introduction of settlement risk 
definitely tilts the balance against the “early” strategy, because 
in this case “early” becomes a strictly dominated strategy 
(“late” outperforms it against any action by the opponent, 
as settlement risk imposes some overnight overdraft in 
probability terms). Thus, settlement risk introduces further 
reasons to delay, eliminating the “early payment” equilibria.
Building on previous work, Martin and McAndrews (2008) 
construct a model with a continuum of banks, each making 
a unit payment to one other bank and each having to decide 
whether to pay “early” or “late.” Banks are assumed to face 
random delay and liquidity costs, determined in turn by bank-
specific shocks that drain (or increase) the available liquidity. 
The paper shows that, depending on the cost parameters (costs 
2 “Early” performs no better than “late,” and it performs just as well as “late” 
if the other also pays early, as offsetting payments incur no charge.
of delay and of overdrafts), on the time-criticality of payments, 
and on the probability and size of liquidity shocks, the resulting 
equilibria feature different degrees of delay. More specifically, 
some or all banks, depending on the shocks received, decide to 
delay their payments. Martin and McAndrews also explore the 
effect of a liquidity-saving mechanism on the banks’ incentives. 
This is shown to mitigate the strategic complementarity of 
banks’ strategies by allowing banks to release payments 
conditional on the receipt of payments. The paper shows that, 
in this case, the extent of delay in equilibrium also depends on 
the pattern of payments (whether payments can be offset in 
pairs or multilaterally), which has implications for the system’s 
efficiency.
The overarching conclusion of these works is that institu-
tional features and, in particular, intraday credit regimes have 
a powerful effect on banks’ incentives; as a consequence, they 
largely determine a payments system’s performance. We draw 
on—and, where necessary, modify—these theoretical 
predictions to study payment behaviour in Fedwire and 
in CHAPS Sterling.
2.3 Implications for Payment Behaviour 
in Fedwire
The Federal Reserve System supplies intraday liquidity to 
Fedwire members in the form of uncollateralised daylight 
overdrafts. Subject to net debit caps, participants can incur 
overdrafts at any time, which incur a charge calculated as 
the average per-minute overdraft during the day, multiplied 
by an effective daily rate, less a deductible.3
As Bech and Garratt (2003) describe, a corollary of this 
charging structure is that participants can avoid overdraft 
charges by synchronising payments. As long as incoming 
payments of at least equivalent value to outgoing payments 
are received within a minute, no overdraft will be required 
and hence no charge incurred. This sets the scene for a 
pure coordination game, in which participants attempt to 
synchronise payments in order to minimise the average 
overdraft position over the course of the day. The theory would 
also predict that if the overdraft fee is deemed to be high 
relative to the expected cost of delay, the efficient equilibrium 
will involve the delay of payments until later in the day.
This theoretical finding is consistent with the empirical 
results obtained by McAndrews and Rajan (2000) on the 
timing and funding of payments in Fedwire. Faced with costly 
intraday liquidity, participants appear to delay payments until 
an end-of-day activity peak, during which the probability of 
3 The effective rate is currently equivalent to an annual rate of 36 basis points.
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receiving funds from other participants is greater. It is argued 
that this synchronised delay reinforces the activity peak. The 
“focal points” for this coordination appear to be provided by 
ancillary system settlement deadlines (in particular, in CHIPS 
and DTC). As McAndrews and Rajan note, though, the 
outcome of this apparent coordination may not be socially 
efficient, since all participants might stand to benefit from 
reduced liquidity costs if coordination could be improved 
so as to take full account of liquidity externalities.
Armantier, Arnold, and McAndrews (2008) extend this 
analysis in their study of recent changes in the timing of 
Fedwire funds transfers. Among other things, they explore 
alternative hypotheses for the timing of late-afternoon 
payment peaks, with particular reference to the change in the 
timing of late-afternoon Fedwire transfers following a move 
to a later CHIPS settlement time. The tendency for Fedwire 
transfers to be made after ancillary system positions are 
settled may reflect the “focal point” hypothesis described 
above. However, it may also be that the liquidity released 
by ancillary system settlement may trigger a “cascade” of 
payments, to the extent that participants are liquidity-
constrained.4 Along similar lines, the settlement may also 
release credit lines, thereby permitting more payments to 
be made. Additionally, the authors suggest that uncertainty 
surrounding the size of ancillary system payouts may lead to 
payments being deferred until after the settlement deadline—
that is, once uncertainty has been resolved. The data do 
not allow for a clear distinction to be made between the 
competing hypotheses; however, there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that the coordination described in the earlier paper 
is only part of the story. 
2.4 Implications for Payment Behaviour 
in CHAPS Sterling
The Bank of England provides intraday liquidity to members of 
CHAPS Sterling in the form of interest-free overdrafts secured 
against eligible collateral. The maximum value of liquidity 
granted is equal to the value of collateral securities posted, less 
a “haircut” to take account of movements in the value of the 
collateral securities. In contrast with Fedwire, where the total 
cost of liquidity is driven by the average overdraft incurred, the 
cost of liquidity in CHAPS Sterling is driven by the maximum 
overdraft position incurred during the day, since the value 
of collateral posted must be at least equal to this position.
The cost of posting collateral derives from the fact that the 
securities posted (or the funds used to obtain the required 
securities) could be used for alternative purposes; participants 
4 See also Beyeler et al. (2006).
therefore face an opportunity cost. As described in Box 1, the 
upper bound to this cost has been estimated to be of the order 
of 7 basis points per annum, although for domestic banks 
subject to the Stock Liquidity Regime the opportunity cost may 
be significantly lower and may even approach zero. 
The Bech and Garratt (2003) model predicts that this regime 
will result in multiple equilibria, with the selection of an 
equilibrium dependent on the relative magnitudes of the cost 
of delayed payment and the opportunity cost of posting 
collateral. The low opportunity cost of posting collateral for 
many CHAPS Sterling members may thus be expected to 
favour an early rather than a delayed payment equilibrium. 
That said, it is difficult to quantify the cost of delay associated 
with all but a small number of time-critical payments. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that costs of delay are low for 
the majority of payments. 
Certain qualifications are required in applying this model to 
CHAPS Sterling. In particular, in the Bech and Garratt model, 
the benefit from delaying payments in a collateralised regime 
derives from the assumption that it is less costly to post 
collateral for the afternoon than for the whole day (and hence 
that there is an incentive to avoid posting collateral in the 
morning). This in turn rests on the assumption that it is 
possible to invest surplus liquidity for a fraction of the day—or, 
in other words, that there exists an intraday market for 
liquidity. It is not obvious that this incentive applies in CHAPS 
Sterling since, in the absence of an intraday market, it is 
probably no cheaper to post collateral for a morning or 
afternoon than for a full day. Once collateral is committed to 
the payments system, the cost for the full day is incurred.5
It is possible to modify the Bech and Garratt model to 
incorporate an incentive to delay that does not rely on the 
existence of an intraday market for liquidity. By delaying 
5 It is nonetheless possible for banks to withdraw liquidity intraday. As we 
argue here, while it may not be possible to lend in an intraday interbank 
market, the collateral could in principle be committed to another payments 
system. In this case, the ability to commit collateral for only part of a day could 
be considered valuable.
In contrast with Fedwire, where the total 
cost of liquidity is driven by the average 
overdraft incurred, the cost of liquidity in 
CHAPS Sterling is driven by the maximum 
overdraft position incurred during the day, 
since the value of collateral posted must 
be at least equal to this position.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 117
payment and taking advantage of incoming funds, a 
participant may be able to reduce the maximum overdraft 
position and hence reduce the aggregate collateral requirement 
for the day (or avoid posting collateral altogether). It can be 
shown that a similar prisoner’s dilemma outcome emerges 
from this model, with both participants defecting despite 
the mutual benefit from paying early, unless they can somehow 
be induced to coordinate earlier in the day.6
However, the finding that some participants may seek to 
reduce their aggregate collateral requirements by delaying 
payments must be seen in the context of the empirical 
observations that participants in CHAPS typically post 
collateral at the beginning of the day (that is, they do not 
generally wait to determine whether collateral posting is 
required) and many post collateral to a value well in excess of 
liquidity usage (for the system as a whole, maximum liquidity 
used is only around one-third of the maximum collateral 
posted).7 Two factors appear to be particularly influential 
in explaining this behaviour.8
First, as discussed in Box 1, the low opportunity cost of 
posting collateral (or of maintaining positive reserve account 
balances) means that, for many banks there appears to be 
little incentive to delay posting collateral until later in the day, 
since the potential savings to be made from reducing the 
aggregate value of collateral posted are small. 
Second, the distribution of “time critical” payments, for 
which the expected cost of delay is high, appears to be skewed 
toward the morning in CHAPS Sterling. For example, pay-ins 
to CLS Bank must be made by 11:00 a.m. in order to avoid 
significant financial penalties, and market convention dictates 
that overnight interbank loans should be repaid the following 
morning. Even for those banks for which collateral posting is 
relatively costly, the expected cost of delay for time-critical 
payments may be so high as to warrant posting sufficient 
collateral at the beginning of the day to ensure that liquidity is 
available to make these payments without the need for recourse 
to incoming funds. The existence of throughput guidelines 
may serve to reinforce the incentive to post liquidity “up front” 
(as we discuss in more detail in Section 2.5).
6 We are indebted to Peter Gibbard for these insights.
7 It should be noted that CHAPS Sterling payments are not the only claim on 
the available liquidity. Participants in the United Kingdom’s securities 
settlement system, CREST, are able to transfer liquidity from CHAPS Sterling 
settlement accounts to separate accounts designated for the settlement of the 
cash legs of securities transactions. Liquidity is also available for the settlement 
of positions in other ancillary systems, such as CLS Bank, retail payments 
systems (BACS and C&CC), and LCH.Clearnet. Unlike CLS Bank pay-ins, 
the latter transfers do not take place in CHAPS Sterling and therefore are not 
recorded in the payment data in this article.
8 In addition to the factors described, there may be frictions associated with 
obtaining eligible securities during the day that tend to encourage early 
posting. Under normal circumstances, intraday repos with the Bank of England 
are unwound at the end of the day and the securities are held in custody by 
the Bank of England overnight, to be reposted the following morning.
The value of collateral posted to support these time-critical 
payments depends on the expectation of the size of time-
critical payment flows. Consider a single period in which delay 
costs are zero up to a certain time (say, the deadline for a 
time-critical payment) and very high thereafter. If all payment 
instructions are known at the beginning of the period in which 
time-critical payments must be made—and therefore all banks 
are aware of whether they will be net payers or net receivers at 
Box 1
The Cost of Liquidity in CHAPS Sterling
James and Willison (2004) estimate the opportunity cost of posting 
eligible collateral as the difference between the unsecured 
interbank rate and the secured-lending repo rate. By posting 
collateral, the bank forgoes the opportunity to repo the securities 
and to lend the funds obtained at a higher rate in the interbank 
market.
As James and Willison acknowledge, this is only part of the 
story. U.K. banks are subject to the Stock Liquidity Regime (SLR), 
under which they are required to hold liquid assets sufficient to 
cover net sight deposit and five-day wholesale cash outflows. 
These assets cannot be repurchased overnight to generate cash 
in the interbank market, but they can be posted with the Bank 
of England to generate liquidity in CHAPS Sterling (since the 
SLR requirements are measured only at the end of the day). For 
those banks subject to the SLR, the opportunity cost of posting 
collateral—and hence the cost of liquidity—may be even lower 
than the 7 basis point estimate.
Three foreign settlement banks in CHAPS Sterling—
accounting for around 14 percent of transactions by value or 
11 percent of transactions by volume—are not subject to the SLR. 
These banks are instead subject to the Maturity Mismatch Regime, 
which does not require banks to hold eligible liquid assets if 
committed outflows equal expected inflows. For these banks, 
the opportunity cost of posting collateral may be higher. However, 
the use by these banks of cross-border collateral arrangements 
(including the ability to back sterling payments with euro cash 
collateral) implies that estimation of the cost of liquidity for 
foreign banks would require analysis of the cost of generating 
liquidity in other jurisdictions.
Following reform of the Bank of England’s money market 
operations in May 2006, participants are now able to hold 
remunerated reserve account balances with the Bank of England. 
These balances can be used to fund payments, so members can 
choose to provide liquidity in this way rather than by posting 
eligible securities. The relative opportunity cost of holding reserve 
account balances may vary from member to member, although 
for some foreign banks, particularly those that do not routinely 
hold sterling collateral, reserve balances may be a relatively 
attractive source of liquidity.118 The Timing and Funding of CHAPS Sterling Payments
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the end of the period—it can be shown that each net payer 
must raise liquidity at least equal to the value of its net 
payments and that this amount will be necessary and sufficient 
to settle all payments in the system (Box 2). Net receivers will 
be able to meet their payment obligations using incoming 
funds and hence will not need to raise additional liquidity. 
Banks’ incentives are therefore aligned and consistent with 
the efficient use of liquidity.
However, this result requires that all participants know at the 
beginning of the period whether they will be net payers or net 
receivers at the end. In reality, participants will not typically 
possess full information about payment flows at the time when 
collateral posting decisions are made, and hence they will face 
uncertainty about liquidity requirements. Faced with high 
threshold delay costs, participants will wish to insure themselves 
against the risk of being net payers and—if the cost of failing to 
make a time-critical payment is sufficiently high—they may 
choose to post liquidity at the beginning of the period to a value 
at least equal to the maximum anticipated gross value of the 
time-critical payments. For payments with low delay costs, 
by contrast, participants may be willing to rely on incoming 
funds rather than post additional collateral. We illustrate this 
scenario using a simple stylised framework (see exhibit).
Here, the choice of the value of collateral posted at the 
beginning of the day is determined by the intersection of 
the expected cost of delay (which varies across payments; in the 
exhibit, X1 percent of payments incurs a delay cost of at least X) 
and the cost of collateral (which, as described above, is fixed 
once collateral is posted). The value of collateral posted must 
be sufficient to ensure that time-critical payments—for which 
the cost of delay is greater than the cost of liquidity—can 
be made without the need for recourse to incoming funds. 
By contrast, for those payments for which the cost of delay 
is lower than the opportunity cost of posting collateral (the 
proportion of payments 100 percent minus X1 for participant 
X), participants may be willing to rely on the recycling of 
incoming funds instead of posting additional liquidity. Such 
payments—particularly those of high value—will typically be 
delayed until after time-critical payments are settled, especially 
when there is uncertainty over the liquidity demands of time-
Box 2
Liquidity Requirements for Time-Critical Payments
For simplicity, assume that banks receive all payment instructions 
exogenously from their customers. These instructions are denoted 
by  —that is, at time t, bank i is requested by its customer(s) to 
pay the amount x to bank j. A payment from bank i to bank j at 
time t is denoted  . Banks choose whether to settle payment 
instructions immediately or to queue them internally. So,   
and   need not be the same.
Consider the case in which delay costs are zero up to a certain 
time T and subsequently so high that all payments must be settled 
within T. It follows that:
.
The payment balance of bank i against bank j at time t is 
defined as:
.
Bank i is a net payer for the period if its total payment balance 
at T is negative—that is, if  . Since customer 
orders are exogenous, banks cannot affect whether they will be net 
payers or net receivers. We assume, however, that banks know with 
certainty at the beginning of the period which type they will be.
We define I as the set of net payers. Each net payer i has 
to raise liquidity to a value at least equal to   in 
order to execute its payment instructions. Hence,   is the 
minimum liquidity required to settle all payment instructions. 
This amount will also be sufficient to settle all payments by 
time T if, first, every net payer raises   at time zero and pays it 
out immediately and, second, at any t, every bank i uses all of its 
liquidity to make payments up to that value (or less, up to the 
exhaustion of queued orders).a Because delay costs are zero up to 
T, this pattern is optimal for all banks. We can therefore conclude 
that, when delay costs are zero up to a time-critical threshold 
and very high thereafter, the banks’ interests are aligned and 
compatible with the efficient use of liquidity. All payments 
are settled using only the minimum liquidity L.
a We are abstracting here from 1) the indivisibility of payments—that is, 
additional liquidity may be required if payments cannot be split and settled 
in tranches, and 2) the possibility that no bank is a net payer—meaning 
that all payments net out exactly. In this case, a bargaining process would 
be required to define who is to provide liquidity, given that liquidity is 
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critical payments.9 In addition, to the extent that there is 
reliance on incoming funds, the liquidity released by the 
settlement of time-critical payments may result in a “liquidity 
cascade,” as queued payments are released. In this way, the 
early settlement of time-critical payments may serve to catalyse 
liquidity recycling later in the day.
The proportion of payments to which this applies will vary 
according to the cost of liquidity. As the exhibit illustrates, 
banks for which the opportunity cost of posting collateral is 
relatively low (for example, cost of collateral Y) will post a 
larger stock of collateral and hence may tend to fund a greater 
volume of payments (Y1) from posted liquidity than from 
incoming funds. However, banks for which liquidity is 
relatively costly may post less collateral and remain more 
reliant on the recycling of incoming payments to fund 
outgoing payments.
Of course, as in the single-period example above, we must 
also take account of the limited information available to 
participants when decisions are made. While a proportion of 
payment instructions may be known at the start of the day 
(which we would expect to be relatively large when payment 
activity is driven by proprietary rather than customer 
business), there may remain considerable uncertainty about 
the size and distribution of incoming and outgoing payments, 
including payments with high delay costs. Faced with such 
uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demands, participants 
would be expected to hold a buffer of liquidity in excess of the 
quantity predicted in this framework in order to withstand 
unforeseen liquidity demands. The tendency to maintain such 
liquidity cushions—which are indeed observed in practice—
will also contribute to the entire system’s resilience to liquidity 
shocks, such as the operational failure of one or more banks to 
make payments.
2.5 Liquidity Recycling in CHAPS Sterling
We have discussed how the apparently low opportunity cost of 
collateral for many participants and the high expected delay 
costs associated with a subset of payments will tend to favour 
posting collateral at the beginning of the day. This may serve to 
reduce the incentive for payment delay and hence avoid the 
prisoner’s dilemma outcomes described in the theoretical 
9 Empirically, banks tend to settle a large volume of low-value payments early 
in the day. This might appear to contradict the predictions of this model, since 
the inherent delay cost associated with any one of these payments is likely to be 
low. However, expected delay costs for these payments collectively may be high, 
since processing of large volumes later in the day may prove difficult and costly 
in the event of an operational incident.
models. However, we have also seen that for payments for 
which the cost of delay is relatively low, participants may rely 
to a greater extent on incoming funds as a funding source in 
order to avoid squeezing the precautionary buffer of spare 
liquidity—or indeed to avoid posting additional collateral.
The efficiency with which incoming funds are recycled 
will depend on the extent to which participants collectively 
maintain the flow of liquidity around the system, perhaps via 
proactive payment coordination. McAndrews and Rajan 
(2000) describe how such coordination is achieved in Fedwire 
through the delay of payments until an end-of-day activity 
peak, but suggest that the observed level of coordination may 
be inefficiently low—and hence liquidity costs inefficiently 
high—due to collective-action problems, exemplifying the 
uncooperative outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma game 
described by Bech and Garratt (2003). In principle, CHAPS 
Sterling members could suffer from a similarly uncooperative 
outcome in which some members defect and withhold 
payments, thereby curtailing the ability of others to take 
advantage of incoming funds.
In practice, the early settlement of time-critical payments 
will contribute to the recycling of liquidity by ensuring that 
payments begin to flow early in the day. In addition, certain 
features of CHAPS Sterling may be particularly conducive to 
achieving a cooperative outcome and hence to ensuring that 
liquidity is recycled efficiently. For example, the CHAPS 
Clearing Company imposes a set of throughput guidelines, 
whereby participants are expected to make 50 percent of 
payments by value by 12:00 p.m. and 75 percent by 2:30 p.m., 
as an average over a calendar month, with the explicit intent 
of improving the efficiency of liquidity usage in the system. 
While enforcement of the guidelines relies on peer pressure 
rather than legal compulsion (Box 3), the guidelines are largely 
observed in practice. As Buckle and Campbell (2003) 
demonstrate, the existence of such guidelines acts to 
countervail any tendency toward payment delay and hence 
serves to promote liquidity recycling earlier in the settlement 
day, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the payments system.
The efficiency with which incoming funds 
are recycled will depend on the extent to 
which participants collectively maintain 
the flow of liquidity around the system, 
perhaps via proactive payment 
coordination.120 The Timing and Funding of CHAPS Sterling Payments
In addition, the concentrated structure of CHAPS Sterling 
appears more conducive to coordinated behaviour than does 
the structure of Fedwire, which has a broader membership. 
CHAPS has fifteen direct members (including the Bank of 
England), and the majority of payments are made by a core 
of four participants. The Fedwire network is more extensive, 
as around 9,500 participants access the clearings directly.10 
This results in very different network topologies, which in turn 
has implications for the flow of liquidity around the systems.11 
In particular, the concentration of payment flows among a 
small group of banks in CHAPS Sterling leads naturally to 
a higher level of recycling throughout the day than would occur 
in a more dispersed system, since each unit of liquidity paid out 
is more likely to be returned quickly if payments are flowing 
between fewer banks. Furthermore, within a “small club” 
of participants, the behaviour of each participant is highly 
visible to others. If one participant defects and fails to provide 
liquidity to the system, other participants may adopt a 
10 Only a small proportion of these banks use Fedwire heavily, however.
11 The network of payments between settlement banks in CHAPS, however, 
is underlain by a more extensive network of payments between the originators 
of payments and the end recipients. The characteristics of this network are 
similar to those of Fedwire. See Soramäki et al. (2006) and Becher, Millard, 
and Soramäki (2007).
punishment strategy, such as delaying their own payments 
to that member. This cost associated with being perceived 
as “free-riding” on liquidity provided by peers in a repeated 
game may thus induce a cooperative outcome.
One specific mechanism possibly enforcing such discipline 
is the use of bilateral net sender limits. This is the simple 
liquidity management rule whereby bank A ceases to make 
payments to bank B if the net flux of payments from A to B 
reaches a certain (positive) limit; in other words, B is 
“punished” if it is seen “not to reciprocate.” Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this mechanism is indeed applied 
by some CHAPS members. The appendix formalizes the 
argument, but the logic behind bilateral net sender limits is 
that they create “interperiod spillovers,” increasing the cost 
of delaying payments by depriving the recalcitrant bank 
of liquidity in subsequent periods. As a result, banks are 
encouraged to make payments promptly, to the benefit of the 
system.12 As shown in the exhibit, the effect of such limits is to 
shift the delay curve to the right. In this framework, the result 
would be to increase the value of collateral posted at the 
beginning of the day. The effect on liquidity usage would 
depend on the effect on liquidity recycling over the course 
of the day.
But even though centralised throughput guidelines and 
decentralised mechanisms may serve as coordination devices, 
the use of bilateral net sender limits (in the form described 
above) would not enforce coordination on a particular time 
of the payment day and hence would not necessarily overcome 
a tendency to delay payments until the end of the day. Acting 
in tandem, however, throughput guidelines and bilateral 
coordination mechanisms can be expected to both enhance the 
efficiency of liquidity recycling and to smooth the intraday 
distribution of payments. We seek evidence of these effects 
in the empirical analysis that follows.
3.T h e  T i m i n g  o f  C H A P S  
Sterling Payments
We now turn to an empirical analysis of the timing and funding 
of payments in CHAPS Sterling. Based on the discussion above, 
we would expect the low opportunity cost of posting collateral 
and the high expected delay costs associated with a subset 
of payments to limit the degree to which members delay 
payments in order to take advantage of incoming funds. We 
12 Bilateral limits also have the important function of reducing the impact of 
“liquidity sinks,” created when a bank is able to receive payments but is unable 
to release funds—for example, as a consequence of a technical outage. By 
restricting flows to the “sink” bank, bilateral limits reduce the amount of 
liquidity that is syphoned out of the system.
Box 3
Enforcement of CHAPS Throughput Guidelines
If a CHAPS Sterling member breaches the throughput guidelines 
in three consecutive months, that member is required to provide 
reasons to the CHAPS Clearing Company and to outline the 
steps taken to ensure that deadlines are met going forward. The 
participant will be given the opportunity to provide evidence that, 
over the period in question, failure to meet the guidelines resulted 
from a lack of payment instructions rather than a shortage of 
available liquidity. 
If the member breaches the guidelines in six consecutive 
months, or in three consecutive months on two occasions, and has 
been unable to provide evidence as set out above, it will be obliged 
to attend a “Star Chamber” hearing. At the Star Chamber, the 
member’s CHAPS board director will be required to explain the 
steps being taken to resolve the issues and to return performance 
to acceptable service levels and guidelines.
There is no defined penalty for the breach: As a rule, peer 
pressure is felt to be sufficient. However, the CHAPS Rules give 
the company manager the power to suspend or exclude a member 
“in material breach” of the provisions of the procedural rules, 
or where, in the opinion of the CHAPS Clearing Company, 
circumstances have arisen that could be “prejudicial” to the system 
or represent a threat to its “security, integrity, or reputation.”FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 121
Chart 1
Value and Volume of Payments of All Banks 
in CHAPS Sterling System
Sources: CHAPS payment database; Bank of England calculations.
Note: We calculate the figures as daily average values and volumes 
in ten-minute intervals, using data from October 2006.
 




























Value and Volume of Payments of Foreign Banks 
in CHAPS Sterling System
Sources: CHAPS payment database; Bank of England calculations.
Note: We calculate the figures as daily average values and volumes 
in ten-minute intervals, using data from October 2006.
 


























Value and Volume of Payments of Domestic Banks 
in CHAPS Sterling System
Sources: CHAPS payment database; Bank of England calculations.
Note: We calculate the figures as daily average values and volumes 
in ten-minute intervals, using data from October 2006.
 



























would expect to see this reflected in the intraday payment 
distribution. We also hypothesise that structural features of 
the CHAPS Sterling system, in particular the imposition of 
throughput guidelines and the “small club” membership, will 
promote the recycling of liquidity and smooth the distribution 
of payments throughout the day.
We first consider the intraday pattern of payments in 
CHAPS Sterling. The system opens for normal service at 
6:00 a.m. and closes at 4:20 p.m. CHAPS settlement banks can 
initiate transfers on behalf of themselves and their clients 
normally until 4:00 p.m., although settlement members may 
make transfers on their own behalf, or on behalf of other credit 
institutions and certain money market participants, for the 
purpose of settling their end-of-day positions after this time.
The intraday profiles of payments in CHAPS Sterling are 
shown in Charts 1-3, alongside the profile of Fedwire payments 
in Chart 4.13 The profile of payments by all banks (Chart 1) 
displays three distinct value peaks: the first around 9:30 a.m.; 
the second between roughly 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.; and 
a third, sustained peak between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. 
The value profiles are similar for foreign and domestic banks 
(Charts 2 and 3, respectively: on average, 55 percent of foreign 
bank payments are made by noon, compared with 58 percent 
13 The analysis in this section is based on data for CHAPS Sterling payment 
flows only; other transfers, such as settlement payments for BACS and C&CC, 
are not included. Our results apply to one month only (October 2006); 
however, our analysis has been repeated for data from June 2005 and 
January 2006, with similar results.
for domestic banks. Both domestic and foreign banks make 
around 25 to 30 percent of payments by value during the 
end-of-day value peak. The profile contrasts with that of 
payments in Fedwire, which exhibits strong concentration 
of payment value at the end of the day (Chart 4). 122 The Timing and Funding of CHAPS Sterling Payments
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Chart 5
Effect of Payment Events on the Intraday Distribution 
of CHAPS Sterling System Payments
Sources: CHAPS payment database; Bank of England calculations.
Note: We calculate the figures as daily average values and volumes 
in ten-minute intervals, using data from October 2006.
 




















Setting aside for the moment the effect of strategic 
behaviour, we note that the observed value peaks correspond 
well with scheduled payment events, particularly those 
associated with time-critical payments and throughput 
deadlines. This result is illustrated in Chart 5.
The first peak (9:30 a.m.) temporally corresponds both with 
the timetable for pay-ins to CLS Bank, which can be made 
during a payment window between 7:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., 
and with the settlement of multilateral net positions in the 
BACS retail payments system.14 In both cases, the value of the 
settlement payments involved is small relative to the total value 
of payments made at these particular times. However, the 
observed peak may reflect the tendency to delay payments until 
after the time-critical payments have been made, when any 
uncertainty around the value of these settlements has been 
resolved. The settlement payments may also release liquidity 
for the settlement of subsequent payments. Sharp value peaks 
also occur ahead of the throughput deadlines, at noon and 
2:30 p.m., suggesting that the guidelines do impact significantly 
on the intraday distribution of payments. In fact, there is prima 
facie evidence that payments are delayed until the period 
immediately before the deadlines, which may reflect strategic 
behaviour.15 
Finally, the value peaks may also reflect the routine patterns 
of activity in the overnight interbank market: Late-afternoon 
14 The plots shown do not include these payments.
15 The noon peak also follows the settlement of positions in the C&CC. 
This may be influential, although the very low value of settlement payments 
in this system suggests that it is unlikely to trigger a liquidity cascade or 
to generate material uncertainty for participants.
value peaks are likely to be reinforced by the creation of 
overnight loans for the purposes of position-squaring, which 
must typically be repaid the following morning. Going 
forward, the effect of overnight markets on payment profiles 
and liquidity usage is fertile ground for future research. 
The volume profile of CHAPS Sterling payments is relatively 
smooth throughout the day for the system as a whole. Volume 
peaks occur shortly after opening and again late in the day. The 
volume profile is notably different for the set of foreign banks: 
Volumes are highly concentrated during the first two hours 
and fall away sharply thereafter. Approximately 40 percent of 
foreign banks’ payments by volume are made by 8:00 a.m., 
compared with only around 15 percent for domestic banks. 
This may in part reflect the settlement of payments queued 
between the opening of continental European markets and 
the opening of CHAPS Sterling. 
The concentration of payment value in Fedwire appears 
to be driven by a distinct skew in large-value payments toward 
the end of the day (Chart 6). This distribution may reflect 
institutionally imposed timings for certain types of payments, 
such as for CHIPS and DTC settlement; the creation of 
overnight loans; and settlement payments in financial markets. 
This is consistent with McAndrews and Rajan’s (2000) 
observation that this peak existed prior to the imposition of 
overdraft fees. However, as discussed above, the peak may 
additionally serve as a focal point for, and be reinforced by, 
proactive payment coordination.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 123
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: $100 million was the 99th percentile for payment size 
on March 19, 2007.
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Large-value payments in CHAPS Sterling, defined as those 
that fall within the 99th percentile of the distribution of 
payment sizes, account for around 75 percent of daily payment 
value. As Chart 7 illustrates, the volume of payments per 
minute in this category is very small, and the intraday 
distribution is smoother than in Fedwire (Chart 6). Peaks 
in the incidence of large-value payments occur at 9:30 a.m., 
12:00 p.m. (perhaps related to the first throughput guideline), 
and at the end of the day (consistent with the timing of large 
position-squaring payments in the interbank market). This 
suggests that the distribution of large-value payments is driven 
by the purposes of the payments in question and less by a 
generalised tendency to delay until the end of the day. 
The early concentration of time-critical payments in 
CHAPS Sterling (in conjunction with other ancillary system 
settlement payments and the possible need for additional 
liquidity transfers to CREST) may also help explain why the 
average value of payments made during the first two hours 
of opening is low. Participants may be reluctant to commit 
liquidity to other large-value payments until these time-
critical payments have been made. This applies less forcefully 
to low-value payments; indeed, it is apparent from Chart 7 
that low-value payments are released into the system early, 
perhaps reflecting their low consumption of liquidity.16
The contrast between the payment profiles in CHAPS 
Sterling and in Fedwire—in particular, the observation that 
16 The tendency to settle a high volume of low-value payments early in the day 
may also reflect the relative complexity of settling high volumes of low-value 
payments in the event of an operational disruption later in the day. See also 
footnote 9. 
payments are much less concentrated at the end of the day 
in CHAPS Sterling—provides some initial evidence that the 
incentives for payment delay are weaker in CHAPS Sterling 
than in Fedwire.17 The profile of CHAPS Sterling payments is 
clearly influenced by the existence of time-critical payments 
and throughput guidelines. To consider whether these patterns 
are also influenced by the strategic behaviour of members, 
we now attempt to disaggregate the sources of funding. In 
particular, we assess whether there is evidence that the use 
of incoming funds varies by time of day and, following 
McAndrews and Rajan (2000), whether peaks in liquidity 
recycling coincide with peaks in payment activity.
4.T h e  F u n d i n g  o f  C H A P S  
Sterling Payments 
4.1 Methodology
To decompose the sources of funding of CHAPS Sterling 
payments, we distinguish between two sources of funding: 
1) payments received from other CHAPS Sterling participants 
within a specified time interval and 2) account balances held at 
the Bank of England, funded both by collateral posting and the 
maintenance of positive reserve account balances.
17 Of course, it is not possible to observe delay directly from the intraday 
payment profile. This would require knowledge of the timing of payment 
instructions, as well as of settlement.124 The Timing and Funding of CHAPS Sterling Payments
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In their study of payment activity in Fedwire, McAndrews 
and Rajan (2000) consider incoming payments as a funding 
source for outgoing payments only if those incoming payments 
offset outgoing payments within the same one-minute interval. 
This definition follows naturally from the overdraft charging 
structure, as fees are based on the outstanding overdraft at the 
end of each minute. Provided that all payments are offset by 
incoming payments within that same minute, irrespective 
of the ordering of the payments, no charge is incurred.
We choose to adopt the same methodology for the 
measurement of incoming payments as a funding source in 
CHAPS Sterling (Box 4). While recognising that payments 
cannot be “offset” within a minute in the same way as in 
Fedwire (if outgoing payments are made first, intraday 
liquidity will be required even if it is subsequently replenished 
by incoming funds), this measure is useful both as a point 
of comparison with Fedwire and as an indicator of liquidity 
recycling in CHAPS Sterling.18 It should be noted, however, 
that this particular measure does not capture the recycling 
of funds hoarded from previous time periods, which is a 
significant omission. We return to this point in a subsequent 
discussion.
18 It is also questionable whether active offsetting of payments within a minute 
is a realistic representation of members’ liquidity management processes. 
However, as discussed in Section 2.5, the use of bilateral limits may result in 
such behaviour being observed, since outgoing payments may be released 
immediately when incoming payments create headroom under a bilateral 
limit.
4.2 Results
We now decompose gross payments into the constituent 
funding sources (Chart 8). While the absolute value of 
payments “offset” by incoming payments increases when the 
value of gross payments increases, the proportion of payments 
funded by incoming payments remains comparatively stable 
throughout the day. On average, during the day, around 
23 percent of payments made are funded using incoming 
payments; the use of incoming payments peaks at around 
42 percent shortly before noon.
Compared with the results for Fedwire (Chart 9), CHAPS 
Sterling does not exhibit a pronounced peak in the share of 
incoming payments as a funding source during the end-of-day 
value peak, although the proportion of payments funded by 
incoming funds is above the daily average at this time. It is, 
however, notable that a distinct peak occurs shortly before 
the first throughput deadline (at 12:00 p.m.), suggesting that 
incoming payments are a particularly important funding 
source at this time. This may ease the liquidity demands of 
meeting the throughput deadline; indeed, this concentration 
may be a product of deliberate payment coordination on the 
focal point(s) provided by throughput guidelines. 
Perhaps the most striking observation from Charts 8 and 9, 
however, is that on this measure, the average level of liquidity 
recycling within each minute is considerably higher in CHAPS 
Sterling than in Fedwire. In other words, the level of liquidity 
recycling, whether as a result of active coordination or 
otherwise, appears to be greater throughout the day in CHAPS 
Sterling. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the 
Box 4
Measurement of “Offsetting” Payments 
in CHAPS Sterling
We define the value of payments made from member i to 
member j within minute t as  . 
The total value of payments made within that minute is 
therefore   and the value of net payments for each 
member, i, is  .
The value of payments not offset within a minute is equal to the 
sum of net payments for the set of members for which N is positive, 
or, equivalently,  . 
The value of offsetting payments is then calculated as the value 
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Shares of Funding Sources of Fedwire 
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Average of Four Days over Half-Hour Intervals
Transfer of account balances
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: Because few payments are made between 12:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m.,
the variation in the shares of funding sources during that period of 
the day is driven by a small number of payments.
more concentrated structure of CHAPS Sterling is likely to be 
more conducive to liquidity recycling throughout the day, both 
as a natural consequence of there being fewer participants and 
as a result of bilateral coordination resulting from “small club” 
behaviour. Such behaviour, in combination with the 
distribution of time-critical payments and the effect of 
throughput guidelines, may ensure that liquidity continues 
to flow smoothly through the system.
4.3 Liquidity Recycling and Liquidity 
Constraints
We noted earlier that the opportunity cost of posting collateral 
(or holding positive reserve account balances) may not be 
uniform across all CHAPS Sterling participants. In particular, 
the cost of collateral, and hence of liquidity, should be higher 
for foreign banks, since they are not subject to the Stock 
Liquidity Regime. If this is the case, foreign banks would have 
a stronger incentive to fund payments using incoming funds, 
and they would be seen to attain higher recycling ratios. Is this 
indeed the case? 
To answer that question, we consider the relationship 
between the maximum proportion of liquidity drawn down 
and the overall level of liquidity recycling achieved by each 
member during the day, measured as the ratio of the value of 
total daily gross payments to the maximum value of liquidity 
used (the recycling ratio). This measure is not subject to the 
critique of the previous section, since it does capture the 
benefits of liquidity hoarded over multiple periods.
There is a wide variation in the extent of liquidity recycling 
achieved by CHAPS Sterling members (see table). Only five 
banks—all domestic—achieve recycling ratios greater than 10, 
and in each of these cases the proportion of liquidity drawn 
down is relatively low.19 The foreign banks achieve lower 
recycling ratios and draw down a correspondingly large 
proportion of available liquidity. This implies that foreign 
banks may indeed face greater liquidity constraints than 
domestic ones, as suggested earlier in our discussion of the cost 
of collateral. As noted, we would expect the incentive to delay 
payments in order to take advantage of liquidity recycling to 
be correspondingly high, but this expectation is not supported 
by the data. How might this be explained?
From Section 3, we know that the intraday value profiles 
of outgoing payments made by domestic and foreign banks are 
similar. However, the ability to recycle liquidity and thereby 
lower aggregate liquidity requirements during the day also 
depends on the distribution of incoming payment flows. 
Charts 10 and 11 clearly illustrate that the pattern of net 
payments is very different on aggregate for domestic and 
foreign banks, even though all members must comply with 
the throughput guidelines. 
Domestic banks are, on aggregate, net recipients of funds 
in the morning and net suppliers of funds in the afternoon. 
Foreign banks exhibit the opposite trend: Net payments are 
negative until late morning and become positive thereafter. 
This implies that domestic banks tend to accumulate funds 
during the morning and then pay these funds out in the 
afternoon, thereby reducing intraday liquidity usage and 
increasing the recycling ratio. When the flows are reversed, 
19 Note that foreign and domestic banks are not differentiated in the table.
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Chart 10
Net Payments for Domestic Banks in CHAPS 
Sterling System
Daily Average, October 2006
Sources: CHAPS payment database; Bank of England calculations.
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Chart 11
Net Payments for Foreign Banks in CHAPS 
Sterling System
Daily Average, October 2006
Sources: CHAPS payment database; Bank of England calculations.
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Chart 12
Liquidity Usage by Domestic Banks
Daily Average, October 2006 
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as is the case for foreign banks, liquidity must be drawn down 
to fund the net outgoing payments; hence, one would expect 
recycling ratios to be lower. However, while the distinction 
between the payment flows of the domestic and foreign banks 
at the aggregate level is striking, these results conceal 
considerable variation within both sets of banks. This is 
apparent from the intraday patterns of liquidity usage, 
illustrated in Charts 12 and 13.
While it is clear that the maximum proportion of liquidity 
used by foreign banks is, on average, higher for much of the day 
than it is for domestic banks, there is considerable variation 
within both sets of banks. Some domestic banks are net payers 
for much of the morning and use a large proportion of their 
available liquidity early in the day. For these banks, the 
recycling ratio is relatively low. Other domestic banks, by 
contrast, use little or no liquidity for much of the day. These FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 127
banks are more able to take advantage of funds received in the 
morning and achieve the highest recycling ratios of all CHAPS 
Sterling members. By contrast, all foreign banks in CHAPS 
Sterling are net payers during the morning and approach their 
maximum liquidity usage early in the day.
So while liquidity recycling appears to be relatively efficient 
in CHAPS Sterling, the extent to which individual banks 
benefit from recycling varies considerably. For those banks that 
are net payers early in the day—including all of the foreign 
banks and some large domestic banks—recycling ratios are 
much lower. One could argue that this results from the low cost 
of liquidity, since the incentive to structure payments so as to 
reduce liquidity costs may be weak. But many of the banks with 
relatively low recycling ratios do appear to face liquidity 
constraints, since they also use a large proportion of liquidity 
posted. This suggests that some banks may be unable to recycle 
liquidity to the extent that they would wish, which may reflect 
the simple observation that coordination will result only if all 
(or a sufficient number) of the banks are similarly incentivised 
by liquidity pressures to cooperate.
The variation in recycling ratios also reflects the effect of the 
other influences on payment timing. The observed patterns of 
net payments in Charts 10 and 11 are likely to reflect structural 
differences in the underlying businesses of the participants and 
their customers, resulting in differences in the distribution of 
payment instructions and deadlines. If, for example, certain 
participants (or their customers) routinely borrow in the 
overnight market while others lend, the payment flows of the 
two groups will be correspondingly different. To the extent that 
these structural factors limit participants’ discretion over the 
timing of payments, this may explain the observed variation 
in the distribution of recycling benefits.20
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis indicates that even though the intraday liquidity 
regime supporting CHAPS Sterling payments does not give 
rise to the same incentives for minute-by-minute payment 
20 The patterns of funding flows in the overnight market are the subject 
of ongoing research at the Bank of England.
coordination as those in Fedwire, the observed degree of 
liquidity recycling appears to be high. We have also seen that 
the intraday profile of payments is comparatively smooth. 
Taken together, these observations reveal that even if collateral 
posting is perceived to be costly by some banks—and hence a 
“liquidity incentive to delay” does exist in CHAPS Sterling—
other features of the system help avoid a prisoner’s dilemma 
equilibrium in which the majority of payments are delayed 
until late in the day. This serves to reduce the maximum 
liquidity required to make a given set of payments and hence 
the aggregate value of collateral that needs to be posted. The 
empirical evidence suggests that payment coordination may 
also play an important role in Fedwire, although in this case 
coordination—and consequently liquidity recycling—is 
strongly concentrated around an end-of-day focal point.
Which features of the system support this high and constant 
level of liquidity recycling? Centralised coordination devices 
are likely to play a role; in particular, throughput guidelines 
counteract any generalised tendency to delay payments until 
the end of the day. Indeed, the spike in the proportion of 
payments “offset” before noon is evidence that the incoming 
funds become an increasingly significant funding source at this 
time of day, reducing the liquidity cost of complying with 
the deadline.
Other forms of “decentralised coordination” between 
members may also be significant. The high visibility of 
payment flows in the concentrated CHAPS system allows 
members to monitor their bilateral positions and to take action 
if counterparts fail to make payments in a timely fashion. 
The prisoner’s dilemma may then simply be resolved through 
the repeated interaction of the small number of participants, 
whereby recalcitrant participants are “punished” for failing 
to provide liquidity to the system. It is arguable that these 
pressures may be less strong in the more diffuse Fedwire 
system. While not explicitly revealed by the aggregate data, 
there is also anecdotal evidence that participants apply bilateral 
net sender limits with respect to other system participants, 
thereby promoting the recycling of liquidity between each 
bilateral pair and enhancing the liquidity efficiency of the 
system. An empirical question remains as to how often these 
limits “bite” in practice, but a “small club” like CHAPS is a 
natural environment for the application of such devices, which 
help generate a smooth payment profile.
The patterns in the timing and funding of CHAPS Sterling 
payments described in this article would appear to be risk-
beneficial, for individual participants and for the system 
as a whole. The low opportunity cost of posting collateral and 
the tendency for all members (domestic and foreign) to post 
collateral at the beginning of the day help ensure that time-
critical payments do not fail for want of liquidity. Moreover, 
the apparently low opportunity cost of collateral results in 
many banks providing a liquidity cushion in excess of that 
While liquidity recycling appears to be 
relatively efficient in CHAPS Sterling, the 
extent to which individual banks benefit 
from recycling varies considerably.128 The Timing and Funding of CHAPS Sterling Payments
required to make time-critical payments. This not only 
increases the resilience of that participant to liquidity shocks, 
but also contributes to the resilience of the system as a whole.
The efficient recycling of liquidity during the day further 
contributes to a reduction in liquidity risk by reducing the 
aggregate liquidity required to make a given set of payments. 
In theory, this is particularly beneficial for those banks that face 
a relatively high cost of liquidity. However, we have seen that 
many of the members that draw down a large proportion of 
available liquidity are unable to take advantage of incoming 
funds to the same extent as other members, perhaps owing to 
the distribution of underlying payment orders from customers. 
For these banks, the likelihood of needing to post additional 
collateral during the day may be correspondingly high.
Our analysis can take several interesting directions. In this 
article, we have formulated a number of hypotheses on the 
determinants of behaviour in a payments system, suggesting 
some implications for the efficiency of the system itself. 
However, we have not been able to disentangle fully the effects 
of the factors identified; this is perhaps an inevitable drawback 
given our descriptive approach. Formal analysis, supported 
and complemented by further econometric work on payment 
data, may help in this direction by shedding additional light on 
key issues such as the effect of membership size on payment 
behaviour and the precise way in which banks achieve 
coordination (using, for example, bilateral net sender limits). 
Our analysis of the variations in liquidity recycling intensity 
also makes a strong case for further analysis of the overnight 
market, particularly its effect on payment behaviour and 
liquidity usage. Ultimately, such analysis will contribute to 
an understanding of how a large-value payments system 
functions and suggest where and how risks to the system 
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We present a simple, formal illustration of a single bank’s 
problem when choosing an optimal level of liquidity. A 
bilateral net sender limit is shown to incentivise early liquidity 
provision and early payment, thereby generating high levels 
of liquidity recycling. No attempt is made here to develop a 
fully fledged game-theoretical model of payments. That model 
would be more complex, because incoming payments would 
need to be modeled as a strategic choice (by the other banks) 
instead of as an exogenous random variable. Considering a 
single bank’s decisions in isolation allows us to focus on the 
marginal effect of a bilateral net sender limit on the incentives 
to post liquidity and to delay payments. We would nevertheless 
expect to find this effect in a more complex setting.
Setting
Suppose that our bank receives payment orders exogenously 
from its customers. To execute these orders, the bank requires 
liquidity, which can be obtained either by posting collateral or 
by waiting for exogenous (and random) incoming payments. 
We assume that our bank faces the following sequence of 
events, all of which occur within a fixed time interval t (which 
can be thought of as a metaphor for a trading day, or part of 
the day such as “the morning”):
t.0 _ _ _ _ _ _ t.1_ _ _ _ _ _t.2_ _ _ _ _ _t.3
                                                                        .
￿A t   t.0, the bank receives payment orders to the value  .
￿A t   t.1, the bank decides how much liquidity to raise, 
, at a cost  .
￿A t   t.2, incoming payments provide the bank with 
additional liquidity  , so the bank has total liquidity 
of .
￿A t   t.3, the bank makes payments  . If  , the bank 
can only pay up to  , so it “queues” an amount 
of payments  . If instead  , then   
and the bank has spare liquidity. To simplify, we assume 
that the cost of a backlog   is a function  , with 
xt wt yt pt δ Qt () ,
xt
wt λ wt ()
yt
lt wt yt + =
pt lt xt <
lt pt lt = ()
Qt xt lt – = lt xt > pt xt =
Qt δ Qt ()
 if  , and   otherwise.21 To 
simplify further, we assume that if  , the bank sells 
the spare liquidity in the market, immediately realising 
; if instead  , then   includes all costs 
derived from delaying payments, in particular, the cost 
of the extra liquidity with which the bank settles or 
cancels the queued payments.
￿ The bank then begins the next period   afresh, with 
no liquidity and no queues (all costs / benefits stemming 
from   are accounted for by  ).
We now look at the bank’s incentives and its optimal choice. 
We want to show how a bilateral net sender limit incentivises 
short queues and thus liquidity recycling. To do so, we 
compare two cases, one in which there is no bilateral net 
sender limit and one in which a limit is implemented.
The Bank’s Problem: I 
No Bilateral Sender Limits
Suppose that incoming payments   arrive according to some 
exogenous distribution f  (.), which is independent of t and 
of the bank’s choices. In this case, the bank’s problem is 
actually a single-period maximisation,22 so we are able to 
eliminate all time indices. By borrowing w, the bank reduces 
the expected queue  , thus abating the expected delay costs 
 (and possibly transforming them into a gain, if  ). 
However, liquidity is costly, and the bank may hope to make 
use of receipts from the other bank (via y). In general, the bank 
will not raise a full  , and it will rely partly on incoming 
payments.
δ Qt () 0 > Q 0 > δ Qt ()0 <
Qt 0 <
δ Qt () Qt 0 > δ Qt ()
t 1 +
Qt δ Qt ()
yt
Q
δ Q () Q 0 <
wx =
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21 A negative queue is a positive amount of liquidity whose positive value 
is a negative cost. Note that, to rule out the existence of “money-making 
machines,” δ and λ (the cost of liquidity) are mutually restrained. See the 
example below.
22 There are no spillover effects between t and t + 1 because we assume that 
the bank realises   from any queue or spare liquidity, beginning 
period t + 1 afresh.
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To find the optimal w, the bank looks at the total cost 
from raising w :
           
                      ,
where r is an upper bound on the incoming payments that the 
bank can expect to receive. Provided that some technical 
convexity conditions hold, the optimal amount of   is 
determined by solving the standard condition  .
Bilateral Net Sender Limit
When a bilateral net sender limit is in place, the distribution of 
incoming payments y is no longer exogenous, but depends on 
previous payments. As a trivial example, if too few payments 
are sent out, the bilateral limit is hit and no further incoming y 
can be expected. More generally, the effect of choosing a 
particular  , and hence a volume of payments ,  spills 
over to the next period and influences the expected amount of 
incoming funds  . As a consequence, compared with the case 
in which no bilateral net sender limits exist, every unit of 
liquidity made at   now carries an extra benefit in terms of a 
liquidity saving at time t (although, of course, only in expected 
terms and only if it actually allows additional payments to be 
made at  ). This interperiod spillover tilts the balance in 
favour of posting more ,  increasing payments and reducing 
the queue. If, in addition, the liquidity cost   increases in time, 
this mechanism is reinforced: The liquidity saved at   by 
posting more   at  t is even more valuable. Similarly, if the 
bilateral limit itself depends on i’s past payments (for example, 
a “bad” payment record may induce the other banks to tighten 
prudentially their bilateral limit toward i ), the incentives to pay 
early will be even stronger.
Cw () λ w () Eδ Q () + =





C′ w () 0 =








The Bank’s Problem: II (Example) 
We now solve analytically the bank’s problem, under particular 
assumptions about the cost functions and the distribution of y. 
Suppose the delay cost is
,
with  . The corresponding graph is therefore:
In this case, the costs of a positive queue   grow faster than the 
gains from spare liquidity (which are simply the negative costs 
from a negative queue).
We also assume that liquidity costs are linear:  
with  . To make the problem interesting, we first impose 
, implying that it is better to post liquidity and make a 
payment than not to post it and fail to make the payment, and 
then impose  , which ensures that it is not optimal to post 
infinite liquidity. Indeed, if it were ,  then  any  pound of 
liquidity would be worth more to the bank than the cost  , 
independently of whether it is used to shorten a queue (which 
gives a benefit  ) or if it results in spare liquidity (whose 
benefit is precisely c, which must therefore be assumed to be 
smaller than  ).
δ Q () CQ if Q 0 ≥
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No Bilateral Net Sender Limit
Suppose   is uniformly distributed in  , so its probability density function is  . 
Then, the bank’s cost function is:
(1)                                      
                                                       
                                                                                                  
                                                  .                            
                                                                                                                          
yt 0 r , [] fy () 1
r
--- =
Cw () λ w () f
0
r







--- Cx w y – – ()
0
xw –
∫ dy c x w y – – ()
xw –
r
∫ dy + + if xwr ≤ –
λw 1
r
--- Cx w y – – ()
0
r









--- + wx – ()
2 c1
2
--- rwx – + ()
2 – if xwr ≤ –
w λ C – () 1
2
---Cr 2x – () – if rxw – <
We now find the optimal w, to be called  .
￿S u ppose   is such that  . In this case, the 
optimality condition would be 
(Opt)       
              
yielding an optimal liquidity   and thus
a total cost equal to
 .
￿S u ppose instead  . Because  , the total 
cost decreases in w as long as   (see equation 1). 
Hence, we would have a corner solution at  , 
which yields a cost  .
Now, the difference   is always 
positive. Hence, the cost-minimizing   is the one found in the 
first case, supposing :
(2)                           .
It should be noted that   has the anticipated properties: 
It increases in x (the amount of payments to make) and in C 
(the cost of queues), and it falls with  , that is, with the 
difference between the cost of liquidity and its benefits as 
end-of-day spare liquidity.
w∗
















--- rλ Cw Cx cr cw – cx + – – + () 0 ==




2 Cc – ()
------------------ rλ –
2 2Cxλ 2crλ 2cxλ Ccr – – ++ () C∗ =
rxw ∗ – < λ C – 0 <
rxw – <
w∗ xr – =
xλ rλ 1
2
---Cr + – C∗ = ∗
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Finally, substitution of equation 2 into equation 1 yields the 
optimal (minimised) cost:
(3)       .
If we set, for example, ,  ,  and , 
the graph of   is:
In this case, the liquidity posted is 66 percent of the 
payments due ( ).
Bilateral Net Sender Limit (BNSL)
Suppose again that   is uniformly distributed. This time, 
however, imagine that incoming payments are drawn from 
, with   determined by a bilateral net sender limit:
                          .
In this case, an increase in   due to higher liquidity 
 pushes up  , which in turn affects the minimised costs 
C∗ 1
2 Cc – ()
-------------------- rλ
2 2Cxλ 2crλ 2cxλ Ccr – – ++ – () =
c 1
2









0 rt , [] rt
rt rt 1 – pt 1 – yt 1 – – () + =
pt 1 –
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(see equation 3). What is the value of such a spillover, from  
 liquidity into time t costs? The answer is
                            ,
which we calculate term by term.
The term   immediately  derives from equation 3, which 
reveals that the expectation term is irrelevant here ( , c, and C 
are constant over time):
(4)            .
To prove the last inequality, recall that  . This 
implies both   and  , which, summed member 
by member, gives .
Expectations do matter on the second term   . In fact,
 an extra pound worth of   translates into one more 
payment only if the available liquidity   turns out to 
be less than the payment orders  , with   unknown at 
. Formally, 
                       .
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0
xt 1 – wt 1 – –
∫ = 1
rt 1 –
--------- xt 1 – wt 1 – – () = W 0 > =
where the last inequality comes from equation 2. Combining 
the equation above and equation 4, we finally have
                                   .
As anticipated, the spillover is negative, corresponding to an 
abatement of costs. When the bank internalises these spillovers, 
these gains (perhaps discounted by a factor )  are added to the 
optimality condition (Opt), which therefore becomes
 .
Hence, the BNSL shifts down the marginal cost schedule. 
This clearly brings about a higher level of liquidity posting in 
 (in the example below, from 66 percent to 80 percent).
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